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NO. 43 NOVEMBER 2019 Introduction 
Israel’s Contradictory Gas Export Policy 
The Promotion of a Transcontinental Pipeline Contradicts the Declared Goal of 
Regional Cooperation 
Stefan Wolfrum 
In order to market its gas reserves, Israel has until now relied on exports to Egypt and 
Jordan. Through regional networking in the energy sector – for example, within the 
framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which was founded at 
the beginning of 2019 – the Israeli government hopes to improve its political relations 
in the region. At the same time, Israel is investing hope in the building of the EastMed 
gas pipeline. Its construction would create a direct export link to Europe, but it would 
thereby also undermine energy cooperation with its Arab neighbours. The European 
Union (EU) should promote regional energy cooperation, as this could promote part-
nerships in other areas. Accordingly, the EU should not support the construction of 
the EastMed pipeline. 
 
Israel is estimated to have between 800 bil-
lion to 1 trillion cubic metres (m³) of natu-
ral gas. Its own consumption amounts to 
around 10 billion m³ per year; in 2017 this 
corresponded to around 35 per cent of total 
energy consumption. However, the exploi-
tation of the gas fields for the export of 
this gas surplus has not progressed far. This 
is the result of Israel’s hastily conceived 
energy policy, which is a result of the 
2011–2013 energy crisis. 
Back then, two developments came to-
gether: First, continued attacks on the pipe-
lines in the Sinai forced Egypt – Israel’s 
main gas supplier – to suspend gas sup-
plies to Israel in summer 2011; second, 
the only developed Israeli gas field, Yam 
Tethys, was depleted at the beginning of 
2012. As a result, the Israeli government 
awarded all exploitation rights for the 
Tamar, Leviathan, Karish, and Tanin gas 
fields to the American-Israeli consortium 
Noble Energy/Delek Drilling without a call 
for tenders, since they had discovered the 
gas deposits. This was supposed to acceler-
ate the development of the gas fields. In 
addition, the Israeli state-owned company 
Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) has granted 
the consortium a stable purchase price until 
2021 that well exceeds the market price. Ulti-
mately, due to a lack of competitive pres-
sure, Noble/Delek’s monopoly position did 
not lead to a swift development of new gas 
fields; moreover, it violated Israeli antitrust 
law. Legal actions followed – interventions 
by the Cartel Office forced Noble/Delek to 
sell some of its shares in the gas fields, there-
by further delaying their development. 
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Controversial Export Strategy 
In the debate that followed, critics from the 
Ministry of Energy and the Israeli Institute 
for Economic Planning warned that national 
gas reserves are indispensable for Israel’s 
strategic autonomy and its own energy 
needs. The Israeli government, the foreign 
ministry, and the National Security Council 
on the other hand have maintained their 
export intentions to this day; they commis-
sioned the interministerial “Tzemach” com-
mittee to develop a government policy. Ac-
cording to its 2012 report, up to 50 per cent 
of gas reserves could be exported. In 2018, 
the “Adiri” committee put this assessment 
into perspective in a five-year evaluation: 
From 2030 onwards, an energy shortage is 
to be expected in Israel, as gas reserves are 
likely to run out due to increasing levels 
of consumption (forecast for 2040: 35 bil-
lion m³ annually) and the conversion of 
electricity generation from coal to gas. 
In the wake of the 2011–2013 energy 
crisis, this unclear policy confused foreign 
investors and kept them away from the 
Israeli market. For example, in 2014 the 
Australian company Woodside unexpect-
edly withdrew from a share purchase in 
the Leviathan gas field, and Edison – an 
already active energy company – left the 
Israeli market in August 2018. Only the 
Greek company Energean and an Indian 
consortium acquired concessions in two 
rounds of tenders for production licences. 
Energean explained that the time necessary 
for the development of the Karish and 
Tanin fields depends not only on Israeli 
domestic demand, but above all on export 
prospects. The Israeli government therefore 
regards the expansion of export opportu-
nities as a means of developing, and thus 
exploiting, its gas reserves economically. 
Expansion of Regional 
Cooperation 
The geographically closest customers for 
Israeli natural gas are Jordan and Egypt, but 
the market situation in the region is chang-
ing rapidly: Although Egypt was dependent 
on gas imports in the past, it has been able 
to cover its own needs through domestic 
natural gas production since the beginning 
of 2019. However, the Egyptian government 
has in the past invested heavily in gas pro-
cessing and liquefaction plants; the costs 
would only be amortised through high levels 
of exports, but this would require the coun-
try to continue importing gas. This market 
approach could subsequently make Egypt 
a hub for the export of liquefied petroleum 
gas. High population growth also suggests 
that Egypt will have to import natural gas 
again in the future. 
After disputes between the IEC and the 
government in Cairo over gas supplies that 
began in 2011, the two countries reached 
an agreement in 2018: Israel is to annually 
export around 7 billion m³ of natural gas to 
Egypt for 10 years. 
For gas exports, Israel has a pipeline near 
Sodom, which has been pumping small 
quantities of gas to Jordan since 2017, and 
the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline, which has 
been idle since 2011. Noble/Delek acquired 
39 per cent of the shares for this pipeline 
for $518 million at the end of 2018. Accord-
ing to expert reports, however, the export 
connection at Ashkelon can only be sup-
plied with 2 to 3 billion m³ per year via the 
national Israeli pipeline system. Further-
more, the transport direction of the pipe-
line has to be reversed, which is costly and 
still delays Israeli gas supplies. Another 
argument against Israeli exports is that the 
Egyptian pipeline network on the Sinai 
Peninsula is already being used for exports 
to Jordan in the opposite direction. Stop-
ping exports is unlikely because Cairo in-
tends to supply half of Jordan’s gas require-
ments by 2019. If Israel wants to consoli-
date or even expand its energy cooperation 
with neighbouring countries, which is nec-
essary to develop its own gas fields, it must 
by all means invest promptly in additional 
infrastructure. 
The construction of a third export pipe-
line, which will be completed by the end of 
2019 and is expected to export 3 billion m³ 
of gas to Jordan annually, is also not pro-
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ceeding without problems. Since many 
Jordanians regard cooperation with Israel 
as treason against the Palestinians, there is 
resistance among the population. Jordanian 
parliamentarians are threatening to termi-
nate the import treaty or are calling for 
sabotage of the pipeline. 
In order to nevertheless advance regional 
gas cooperation, Israel joined the EMGF as 
a founding member at the beginning of 
2019. The forum also includes Egypt, Jordan, 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and the Palestinian 
Authority. It aims to create a common gas 
market around the Eastern Mediterranean 
by coordinating the energy policies of mem-
ber countries. At present, the EMGF is a 
loose association and serves only communi-
cation purposes. Nevertheless, it is a prom-
ising format: Firstly, it is intended to har-
monise the expectations and objectives of 
the gas importers and exporters in the 
region; secondly, it aims to guarantee secu-
rity of supply; thirdly, it will promote inter-
dependence through price collusion and by 
merging infrastructure in the region. Israel, 
in particular, hopes that cooperation in the 
EMGF will improve its relations with Jordan 
and Egypt: from the current security co-
operation to the expansion of economic 
relations to a normalisation and deepening 
of political relations. 
The EastMed Pipeline 
However, Israel is not only counting on ex-
ports to the region, but also on the planned 
construction of a pipeline to Europe. Cyprus, 
Greece, and Italy also support such a trans-
continental pipeline. In 2015 they asked 
the EU Commission to define the so-called 
EastMed project as a Project of Common 
Interest (PCI) (No. 7.3.1) and to include it in 
the Ten-Year Network Development Plan 
(Project Code: TRA-N-330), which aims to 
improve connectivity of the energy infra-
structure in the EU. The pipeline project 
thus fits into the framework of the South-
ern Gas Corridor, which the European Par-
liament (EP) and the Council of the Euro-
pean Union adopted in Regulation 347/ 
2013. At the end of 2015, the European 
Commission, with the support of the Com-
missioner for Climate Policy and Energy, 
Miguel Arias Cañete, adapted this regula-
tion by adding the pipeline project to the 
second PCI list. The Council and EP agreed 
to the list, and it came into effect two 
months later. 
Construction of the EastMed would take 
four to five years and cost around 7 billion 
euros, with the EU bearing half of the 
cost. The other half would be financed by 
IGI Poseidon – a subsidiary of the Greek 
DEPA – and the Italian Edison. IGI Posei-
don carried out a feasibility study in 2016 
that was financed with 2 million euros 
from the Connecting Europe Facility pro-
gramme. In 2022, the development phase 
and planning of the front-end engineering 
should be completed. The final implemen-
tation will then depend on the EU Commis-
sion, which approves the release of funds. 
The pipe linkage to the EU would offer 
Israel a secure sales market and a way out 
of the energy isolation of the Middle East. 
This would make the EastMed pipeline an 
alternative to reforms of its own energy 
market and the costly expansion of infra-
structure with its partly reluctant neigh-
bours Egypt and Jordan. But although the 
feasibility study considers the construction 
of the world’s longest pipeline to be realis-
tic, it is not just the high costs and the 
security situation in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean region that speak against it. 
Trade-off between Regional and 
Transcontinental Cooperation? 
For Israel, the construction of the gas link 
to Europe is attractive, primarily for secu-
rity reasons. According to Israeli Energy 
Minister Yuval Steinitz, direct gas trade 
with the EU would deprive Arab states of 
the opportunity to put Israel under political 
pressure. Conversely, however, this project 
would undermine any regional cooperation 
in the energy sector. The exclusive access 
that Israel, Cyprus, and Greece would get to 
the EU gas market with the EastMed project 
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would marginalise the Arab countries of 
the EMGF, and thereby paralyse the organi-
sation. The economic and political potential 
of a common gas market in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, as envisaged by the EMGF, 
would remain untapped. 
Israel’s decision between regional and 
European sales markets does not have to 
be a zero-sum game though: Through long-
term integration into the regional gas mar-
ket, the European market could also be 
served if natural gas from the region were 
transported to the liquefaction plants in 
Egypt. This would be more cost-effective 
than pipeline construction and would spur 
the gas suppliers Cyprus and Israel towards 
far-reaching cooperation with Egypt as an 
energy hub. 
Economic cooperation would also have 
an important side effect: The developing 
interdependence would not be easily re-
versed and could lead to an expansion of 
relations in the region. In particular, the 
EMGF could contribute towards resolving 
energy and inter-state conflicts, such as 
allocation of the Aphrodite gas field be-
tween Israel and Cyprus. The dynamics 
of the emerging gas market in the Eastern 
Mediterranean have, for example, already 
led to Lebanon – not a member of the 
EMGF itself – being put under pressure to 
negotiate the course of its maritime borders 
with its arch-enemy, Israel. The member-
ship of the Palestinian Authority in the 
EMGF could also mean a new constellation 
in the Middle East conflict. Israel has al-
ready engaged in talks with the Palestinians 
about exploiting the gas reserves off the 
coast of Gaza. 
Conclusions 
The EU should take a clear stand against 
Israel’s contradictory gas export policy: 
Regional energy cooperation in the Eastern 
Mediterranean must take precedence over 
an expensive transcontinental pipeline 
project. The economic benefit of the project 
is doubtful anyway, because potential sup-
plies from the Eastern Mediterranean (ini-
tially 10 billion m³ per year) are insignifi-
cant in relation to the total European 
demand. The EU could also achieve its ob-
jective of diversifying gas imports from 
third countries without pipeline construc-
tion. For example, a study by the EU’s 
Directorate-General for External Policies in 
2017 points to Egypt’s key role in the gas 
market of the Eastern Mediterranean. It 
recommends relying on existing Egyptian 
infrastructure in order to supply the Euro-
pean market flexibly. Investments in addi-
tional infrastructure would only make 
sense once regional cooperation was func-
tioning. In addition, the EU has declared an 
interest in intergovernmental cooperation 
in the region; it already supports it in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Barce-
lona Process (today: Union for the Mediter-
ranean), and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. 
It would therefore be appropriate for the 
EU to reinforce the EMGF’s claim to unify 
and coordinate the energy market in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. The uncertain eco-
nomic benefits of pipeline construction 
would be offset by the considerable politi-
cal benefits of regional cooperation. Since 
integration into the region through co-
operation in the gas market would also 
offer political advantages for Israel, the EU 
should not further promote the EastMed 
pipeline project. Corresponding options 
for action would be: a debate in the EP, an 
agenda item in the Council, and the removal 
of the project from the PCI list by the EU 
Commission at the next proposal in 2021. 
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